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ACT III
AFTERWORD: NEW "TRUTHS"
AND THE OLD FIRST AMENDMENT
Collins & Skover*
If [our values] are lies, they are . .. true lies;
if illusions, then indispensable ones.
To abandon them is to commit moral suicide.
-Alexander M. Bickel'
We begin with Bickel.
Back in 1973, he spoke those words at Yale Law School. Bickel had
free speech theory in mind. The renowned constitutional scholar posed
a paradox: lies may be vital to the life of the First Amendment.'
To some, perhaps most, this complex passage sounds odd, especially
coming from the lips of the counselor recruited by the New York
Times in the Pentagon Papers case.' For it was in that controversy
between government and press that the foreign-born Bickel vindicated
a basic tenet of American democracy-deception is antithetical to the
First Amendment.
As far as we can say, Bickel never resolved the tension between lies
and First Amendment values that he so poignantly identified. Regret-
tably, his reflections on free speech theory ended with his untimely
death one year after his Yale lecture. He never told us how lies could
be true, or exactly why illusions are indispensable. No, he left those
questions unanswered and slipped gently into the night.
This Symposium invites us to pick up where Professor Bickel left
off. It presents an opportunity to return to the "sketch"" of the topic
explored in the Epilogue of The Death of Discourse. That sketch in-
* 0 1996 Collins & Skover. We are indebted to David J. Willbrand, Editor-in-Chief of the
University of Cincinnati Law Review, for his creative and insightful efforts in making this
Symposium possible.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 77, 78 (1975) (commenting on
Holmes's marketplace-of-ideas theory); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
OUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLITICS 92-98 (1962) (discussing "be-
nevolent illusions"). To the best of our computer-assisted knowledge, the epigraph has never
been quoted in the American law review literature.
2. Bickel's larger point, of course, transcended First Amendment theory to encompass con-
stitutional jurisprudence and political philosophy.
3. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
4. RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DIsCOURSE 252 n.2
(1996).
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troduced perplexing connections among lying, free speech theory, and
political philosophy. We had hoped that others would subsequently
draw more detailed portraits. Happily, our colleagues in this Sympo-
sium have done just that, and colorfully so.
If for no other reason, this Symposium is important because it fea-
tures the ideas of scholars, outside the law, on values within the law of
the First Amendment. As we emphasize in our book, discourse on free
speech stands to benefit considerably from the contributions of those
who think beyond the letter of the law. This is entirely consistent with
the notion in The Death of Discourse that the First Amendment is
more than law-it is a way of life.
A few more prefatory comments. The Death of Discourse is far less
categorical and far more provisional than is apparent at first glance.
Indeed, we encourage our readers throughout to engage in a dialogue
with us.' Among other things, we pose questions, shift perspectives,
fashion bold and seductive claims," and move the discourse in and out
of exchanges with our Dramatis Personae-much in the interest of a
"collective process of conversation and judgment."'7 We feel compelled
to make this disclosure because depictions of our work as closed, static,
or dogmatic summon us to defend a book that we did not write.
Several of our colleagues in this Symposium address the role and
rule of "narrative" in the First Amendment context. Judging from
their statements, they dwell on the substance of narrative to the virtual
exclusion of narrative style. Yet, one might discern a good deal about
narrative plot from narrative form. After all, "no text worth reading
wears its meaning on its sleeve." 8 For whatever reasons, our colleagues
generally decline to address such methods of argument in The Death
of Discourse. Hence, it would be premature for us to proceed too far
with these telling matters. For now, our cerebral flirt should suffice to
catch the mind's eye of the attentive reader.0
5. See, e.g., id. at xxiii-xxv, 216 n.(d), 252 n.2, 278.
6. Consider generally ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE: LIFE AS LITERATURE 22-41
(1985) (discussing rhetorical tropes in Nietzsche's writing).
7. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 264 (1984).
8. STANLEY RoSEN, HERMENEUTICS AS POLITICS 142 (1987).
9. Consider generally NEHAMAS, supra note 6, at 13, 22, 28, 31 (noting relationship
between Nietzsche's thinking and his writing style); NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 5,
8, 10, 22 (Martin Coyle ed., Manchester Univ. Press 1996) (Machiavelli's style).
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The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no mans wit
Can well direct him, where to looke for it.
-John Donne'0
Considering how several of our colleagues characterize our passion
for truth, we are reminded of a fetching quip: "Tell your boss what
you think of her, and the truth will set you free." Not only may we be
unable to afford the truth, but, in our postmodern world, truth is a
virtual reality. Either way, truth is troublesome.
Predictably, our colleagues are troubled by the image attributed to
us as truth-tellers:
9 Shadia Drury: The authors exhibit a "valiant devotion to truth.""1
. . . "Collins and Skover's devotion to truth is so grandiose that it
leaves no room for ideals or for the inevitable discrepancy between the
ideal and the actual."' 2
e David Nyberg: "[T]hey themselves insist on truth-telling no matter
what the consequences. Fiat veritas, et pereat mundas [Let there be
truth, though the world may perish]."1
9 Robert Hariman: "I can't help but wonder whether The Death of
Discourse carries a yearning for a heroic world [replete with heroic
truths]."14
True to their convictions, these colleagues seem to devalue the pur-
suit of truth. Some of them can be understood as urging us to move
away from the Enlightenment's notion of truth-seeking--a paradigm in
which truths are both real and discernible. By the same token, they can
be read as inviting us to move toward a view of "narrative truth"-a
paradigm in which "truths" have currency as satisfying stories.
To all appearances, Professor Nyberg appeals to narrative truths as
epistemological criteria for First Amendment theory. Nyberg argues
that "Madisonian First Amendment conservatorship can be better de-
scribed in many if not most instances as based upon narrative truth
(granted its fictional and deceptive qualities) . . . ."' Does not some-
thing of this mindset likewise inform Professor Hariman's suggestion
that Madisonian rationality is the "wrong standard"? Thus, we " 'feel'
10. John Donne, An Anatomy of the World, in THE COMPLETE POETRY OF JOHN
DONNE lines 207-08 (John T. Shawcross ed., New York Univ. Press 1968).
11. Shadia Drury, Lying and Politics, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1996).
12. Id. at 1230.
13. David Nyberg, Noble Lies, Narrative Truths, and The Art of Voice: Thoughts on
Pragmatic Language and the First Amendment, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1996).
14. Robert Hariman, Machiavelli at the Fair, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237, 1242 (1996).
15. Nyberg, supra note 13, at 1207.
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the irrelevance of the model of Madisonian speech" given the "radical
relativism within modern society . ". .. " And it is precisely this philo-
sophical position that prompts Professor Drury to protest that "the
postmodern world has dispensed with truth .. . . In a world where
reality and truth are a void, the creative art rules supreme. "17
The Enlightenment and narrative concepts of truth, however similar
they may appear, are as different as Aristotle and Madison on the one
hand, and Rorty a and Fish 9 on the other. Essentially, the move from
Enlightenment truth to narrative truth parallels the transition from the
modern to the postmodern. This transition substitutes aesthetics for
foundationalism; "that art is worth more than truth is the dominant
principle of our time." '
Too much talk of narrative can be dizzying. In order better to target
the discussion, we offer the following defining points in rapid-fire:
- Madisonian ideals are anchored in Enlightenment truths. By con-
trast, narrative truths afford no safe harbor for Enlightenment truths.
* In principle and practice, traditional Madisonian values war with
pluralistic narrative truths and varying aesthetic judgments.
- One defender of Madisonian ideals-whom we call the classi-
cist"1 -is intolerant of those corruptive influences of the popular com-
mercial culture that invite Huxleyan tyranny.22 By contrast, the de-
fender of narrative truths-somewhat like the free speech advocate we
call the modernist 28-tolerates a great measure of the popular commer-
cial culture in order to avoid Orwellian tyranny.
* Another defender of Madisonian ideals-whom we call the reform-
ist24-compromises Enlightenment values as a pragmatic measure
while firmly believing in them. By contrast, the defender of narrative
truths does not ultimately believe in the Enlightenment, but is willing
to advance "salutary" Madisonian myths.
16. Hariman, supra note 14, at 1254.
17. Drury, supra note 11, at 1233.
18. See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
When asked to comment on the excesses of Western culture, Professor Rorty once replied, "I
think it's the best little culture anybody ever thought of. It will appear to our remote descend-
ants pretty crude, primitive and nasty, but as cultures go these days it's terrific." Martyn Oliver,
Towards a Liberal Utopia: An Interview with Richard Rorty, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT,
June 24, 1994, at 14.
19. See generally STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SuCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A
GOOD THING, Too (1994).
20. ROSEN, supra note 8, at 138.
21. See COLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 27-29, 36-39.
22. See id. at 6-7, 25-27, 44-45.
23. See id. at 30-31, 39-42.
24. See id. at 31-33, 42-43.
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* The defender of Madisonian ideals withholds constitutional protec-
tion from the excesses of "junk" and pornographic speech. By contrast,
when narrative truths are elevated, their defender protects such speech,
but in the name of moderating values.
* For the defender of Madisonian ideals, there can be "noble lies" in
furtherance of discernible truths. By contrast, for the defender of nar-
rative truths, it is far more difficult to call the fabrication of reality a
lie, because there are no ultimate truths."'
These bulleted points indicate that the old First Amendment is radi-
cally different from the new "truths" told about it. To defend the for-
mer is to attack the latter, and vice-versa. Therefore, it is critical to
remain clear-minded about the ramifications of moving from the
Madisonian to the postmodern. Let us examine further some of those
ramifications.
An epoch approaches its end when its
fundamental conviction begins to weaken and
no longer inspires enthusiasm among its advocates.
-Albert Borgmann
26
The Death of Discourse recognizes a phenomenon akin to the free
speech narratives discussed by some of our colleagues. It points to this
phenomenon, not so much as a philosophical matter, but more so as a
socio-economic cultural matter. Hence, in the mass commercial en-
tertainment culture, "truth is irrelevant," " '[t]ruth is what sells,' "
"[t]here is no test of truth," and "[t]ruth is what you want people to
believe.' 2 In fact, commercial narratives draw much of their blood-
flow from postmodern attitudes toward truth and lying. Men wear
shirts and feel like daisies; liberation comes to women who puff ciga-
rettes; chemical and gas companies console us with promotional visions
of snow-capped mountains and green fields. These are the narratives
of We the People, not those heroic narratives told by the elitist conser-
vators of the First Amendment.
None of our colleagues is willing to champion these narratives of the
capitalist marketplace. They agree, explicitly or sub silentio, that there
is an immense gap between Madisonian First Amendment "ideals"
and many modem free speech practices. 8 But that gap is obfuscated
25. See, e.g., Drury, supra note 11, at 1232-33.
26. ALBERT BORGMANN, CROSSING THE POSTMODERN DIVIDE 48 (1992).
27. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 109, 110 (quoting, in part, Jules Henry).
28. To be fair, there are passages in which Professors Nyberg and Hariman suggest that
the theory-practice gap may not be as wide as we depict it. See, e.g., Nyberg, supra note 13, at
1217; Hariman, supra note 14, at 1247-48. Such arguments presume, however, that there are
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when several of our colleagues engage in motivational analysis. That
is, they are less concerned with the dissonance between First Amend-
ment "ideals" and cultural practices than they are with the intentions
of those who rationalize that dissonance. For us, the focus turns 180
degrees--this notwithstanding our bold claims about "deliberate lies"
and our tentative speculations about those who advance such "lies."' '
However informative a discussion of the spectrum of volitional un-
truths, is it not more fruitful to examine the high against the low,
rather than to fix on perplexities akin to criminal culpability under the
Model Penal Code?
Let us offer one preliminary answer to our question. The greater
the divide between Madisonian ideals and commercial entertainment
realities, the more muted is the voice of those ideals. Though ideals by
definition presuppose some discrepancy between the aspirational and
the actual, no First Amendment narrative can tolerate a span so wide
as to erode belief in its ideals. A culture's noble free speech theory loses
its staying power if it is no longer likely to be believed. Ultimately, to
remain functional, a Madisonian myth (or any ennobling narrative)
must be a likely object of trust.
The viability of any Madisonian myth, of course, is fundamentally
what we question in the Epilogue of The Death of Discourse. We ask
whether the First Amendment ideals espoused by courts and commen-
tators-the stuff of which "noble lies" or "cultural myths and narra-
tives" are made-are or could really be shared societal values. To that
end, our "cultural approach" abandons (though at no little cost) the
old ideals in the name of new realities. But why? Our reply has every-
thing to do with what Professor Nyberg appropriately calls "pragmatic
language."8 0 That is, what real chance do Madisonian principles or
elevated narratives stand in a carnival culture? In the end, however,
Professor Nyberg's own "pragmatic" argument proves unresponsive. It
is one that sounds "too ideal,""1 and extends little beyond Echoing nar-
ratives "over and over""2 and over and over and over ....
pockets of private and public expression that are largely immune from the ubiquitous influences
of our mass commercial entertainment culture. In this regard, see COLLINS & SKOVER, supra
note 4, at 22-23, 77, 153, 201-03.
29. Consider supra notes 6 & 9 and accompanying text.
30. Nyberg, supra note 13, at 1213 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 1223.
32. Id. at 1225.
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The unkept promises of the Enlightenment
require apologists of Liberalism to cover
up. . . Hypocrisy [thus] becomes an
integral feature of mature Liberalism.
-Sue Curry Jansen88
Putting lies aside (if only for a moment), let us consider instead the
role of hypocrisy in First Amendment thinking. That is, what are we
to make of a liberal democracy that encourages base practices to mas-
querade as noble principles? Does modern constitutional liberalism de-
pend on hypocrisy to survive? And just how candid can any free speech
narrative be?
Eminent philosophers and social scientists have argued that hypoc-
risy is endemic to life and law. Much in the character of the modern
democratic state, they contend, not only allows hypocrisy in govern-
ance, but demands it. Correlatively, stringent insistence on truth-telling
imperils the health of liberal democracy.8 The late Professor Judith
Shklar, for example, maintained that "[h]ypocrisy is one of the few
vices that bolsters liberal democracy." 5 Such hypocrisy stems from the
disparity between a polity's creed and its conduct. "This disparity
often develops over time as an institution comes to serve purposes other
than those for which it was established."86 As we suggest above, the
move from Madisonian truths to narrative ones carries with it the bag-
gage of hypocrisy.
Some of our colleagues acknowledge this underbelly of liberal de-
mocracy as revealed in the body of First Amendment theory."7 For
example, Professor Hariman declares: "[T]he lesson to be learned is
that any society depends on systematic (although not absolute) inatten-
33. SUE CURRY JANSEN, CENSORSHIP: THE KNOT THAT BINDS POWER AND KNOWL-
EDGE 203 (1991). Remarkably, this most thoughtful work on censorship has yet to receive the
attention it richly deserves in the legal literature.
34. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 67-78, 248-49 (1984).
35. Id. at 248; cf. Dennis F. Thompson,- Hypocrisy and Democracy, in LIBERALISM
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY & THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N.
SHmIAR 173-90 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (offering one explanatory interpretation of the pas-
sage quoted in the text).
36. Thompson, supra note 35, at 176.
37. Virtually all of our colleagues in this Symposium confine their comments on lying or
hypocrisy to a defense of modern liberalism, i.e., "narratives" that accord First Amendment
protection in the name of high ideals. What is overlooked, however, is our discussion of respect-
able stories employed by radical feminists to withdraw First Amendment protection from por-
nography. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 179-84, 196-99. What are we to make of
our colleagues's silence here? Only Professor Drury addresses, albeit obliquely, the matter by
noting, "Radical feminists are particularly notorious for their creative lies." Drury, supra note
11, at 1234. On this score, what are we to make of the fact that the radical feminists alone are
tagged as deliberate liars?
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tion to its contradictions, an inattention that is directed mythically
... ," "Likewise," he adds, "the test of the First Amendment is not
so much that it provides an accurate representation of American dis-
cursive habits, but that it can provide the rhetorical norms for re-
newing specific discursive practices." 8 A far less sympathetic Professor
Drury observes: "There is no doubt a certain hypocrisy on the part of
those who use First Amendment arguments in order to defend [low]
speech [practices] ....
Granting arguendo the importance of First Amendment narratives,
must one also grant the necessity of a hypocritical narrative or myth?
Hypocrisy typically enters into these narratives whenever elevated sto-
ries are heralded. By contrast, narratives that reflect the popular com-
mercial culture do not depend on such hypocrisy, if only because they
more closely align low realism with low idealism. When the ceiling
crashes through the floor, hypocrisy is no longer foundational Liberal
democracy of the postmodern variety must suffer a significant degree of
narrative hypocrisy because it is unable to free itself altogether of
traditional Madisonian values. Sociologist Todd Gitlin-an astute de-
fender of Madisonian liberalism-puts it forcefully: "[Tihe immense
gravitational field of the Enlightenment is not so casually escaped, even
by its critics."
''1
Ponder this: "Man has to choose between peace of mind deriving
from a pleasing delusion and peace of mind deriving from the unpleas-
ing truth.""14
Without shrugging off the Enlightenment's values, our postmodern
free speech narrators have chosen the uneasy position of owning
mythic hypocrisy that cannot be revealed-at least not too often or too
openly. Political pragmatism would appear to dictate that our narra-
tors hide behind a curtain as opaque as the one that concealed the
pitiful wizard in the Land of Oz. 8 In more familiar free-speech terri-
38. Hariman, supra note 14, at 1240.
39. Id. at 1241.
40. Drury, supra note 11, at 1230.
41. TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF. COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS WRACKED
BY CULTURE WARS 214 (1995).
42. LEO STRAUSS, LIBERALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 85 (1968). However understand-
able in these times, it is not axiomatic that because one invokes the thought of the late Professor
Strauss one is thereby a "Straussian" or views the world through a "Straussian lens," whatever
those charges may mean. In this regard, consider, for example, STANLEY ROSEN, PLATO'S SYM-
POSIUM xiv-xv (2d ed. 1987).
43. Somewhat puzzled, we ask our colleagues: Was the wizard a wonderful story teller?
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tory, exactly how candid can our narrative conservators of the First
Amendment be when it comes to the tales they tell? Consider, for ex-
ample, an imaginary opinion of the United States Supreme Court. A
portion of that opinion follows.
Justice ANONYMOUS announced the judgment of the Court, and
delivered an opinion with respects to Parts II, III-A, IV-D, and V-
C(1), which is for the Court:
I
We are called upon to determine the constitutionality of a
Kansas law that restricts specified kinds of imagistic cigarette ad-
vertising on World-Wide Web sites and other computer on-line
services located within the state. Among other arguments, Peti-
tioners maintain that such commercial expression is protected
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. For the
reasons set forth below, we agree and reverse the judgment of the
state supreme court.
This case comes to us against the backdrop of our profound
national commitment to the narrative of truth, however under-
stood or defined, as one of the central purposes behind the First
Amendment. Moreover, this narrative serves other important
First Amendment values, such as the myth of the marketplace of
ideas and the respectable tales of deliberative discourse, broad
and fluid as those narratives must necessarily be. Those who won
our independence were not openly nihilistic; they realized the
importance, nay the necessity, of high-minded stories to rational-
ize the protection of almost any form of expression, communica-
tive or otherwise. The civilizing force of such myths may serve to
make us what we say we aspire to be. These narratives, then,
inform the "analysis" that follows....
We suspect that any proponent of narrative truths would hesitate to
sign onto this opinion." Perhaps we are wrong. If not, what does this
An imaginative myth maker? A confused narrator? A profound philosopher? A deliberate liar?
Or all of the above?
44. On a more general level, Professor Drury does not seem to be entirely troubled by
hypocrisy in the First Amendment context because she believes that such hypocrisy is readily
detectable. For example, "Restrictions on advertising and pornography are quite compatible
with the intentions of Madisonian discourse .... When cigarette companies complain that the
restrictions imposed on their advertising rob them of their freedom of speech, no one takes their
argument seriously; their lie is so blatant that it fools no one." Drury, supra note 11, at 1230.
Argued as a worthy classicist.
Conceptually, withholding First Amendment protection from advertising and pornography
in today's mass commercial entertainment culture is not as uncomplicated as Professor Drury
might have us believe. Advertising and pornography are no longer, if they ever were, insular
categories that can be surgically removed from the body of our culture. The commingling of the
commercial and non-commercial is so extensive that what was once "blatant" is now "blatant"
1303
1304 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
sample opinion suggest about the character of hypocritical myth-mak-
ing? Duly mindful of motivational analysis, we wonder at what point
a narrative of hypocrisy unravels into something less grandiose: a de-
liberate lie, perhaps? One revealing point of demarcation, it seems,
would be the unwillingness of a narrator to be forthright with his or
her audience. The greater this unwillingness, the greater the likelihood
that hypocrisy deconstructs into lying.
There is a curious custom in the British
Navy: all the cordage of the Royal Fleet,
whether heavy or light, is twisted so that
a red thread runs through whole ropes,
by which even the smallest piece can be
recognized as Crown property.
-Johann W. von Goethe4
5
Can we untangle hypocrisy from Madisonian values by educating
ourselves? Several of our colleagues hope so. They attempt to avoid
free speech critiques of the popular culture by relying on education, by
raising public consciousness, and by refining the tastes of Americans.
With the fighting spirit of the late Robert Maynard Hutchins,"' they
tie the fate of America to an Enlightenment-like faith in education.
Mind their rallying cries:
9 Robert Hariman: "[T]he direction that I would recommend for
resolving the problem of maintaining citizenship ... in the spirit of
civic-republican reform ought to be developing rhetorical competencies
rather than restricting competing forms of expression."'17 . . . "[Tihe
focal point for reorienting the First Amendment should be protecting
and nurturing particular communities that allow the development of
the rhetorical competencies required for achieving deliberative judg-
ment in an open society. These communities will range from high
schools to electronic networks to .. .talk shows and beyond.""8
and "mainstream" at the same time. This blending is so significant that Americans now define
their very lifestyles and identities in terms of commodities. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note
4, at 88-89, 114-15. To be unmindful of these points is to allow a form of censorship in modem
America tantamount to tyranny. Of course, the specter of censorship prompts some "Enlighten-
ment" liberals to tolerate hypocrisy.
45. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, THE SUFFERINGS OF YOUNG WERTHER & ELEC-
TIVE AFFINITIES 238 (Victor Lange ed. & Elizabeth Mayer & Louise Bogan trans., 1990)
(from Elective Affinities).
46. See generally MARY ANN DZUBACK, ROBERT M. HUTCHINS: PORTRAIT OF AN EDU-
CATOR (1991).
47. Hariman, supra note 14, at 1248.
48. Id. at 1255.
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* David Nyberg: "The institutional failure that deserves more atten-
tion here . . . is an educational one; it is the failure to instill . . . a
sense of self-discipline, a disposition to seek and appreciate excellence,
and a belief in the long-term benefits of moderation, or balance in the
ways that we live."" 9 . . . "The kind of education that we need to
combat passive, mindless consumerism and fascination with pornogra-
phy is-exposure to greatness, to excellence." 50
* Loyal Rue: "What about the schools?... [W]e should not underesti-
mate the possibility that the tastes of American consumers of culture
might be elevated by means of education. The educational establish-
ment is still largely independent of the media culture, and increasingly
hostile toward it."5' 1
Our colleagues's appeal on behalf of education is valiant. Narrative
heroicism notwithstanding, is theirs a battle that can be won? We
wonder whether the education envisioned by our colleagues does not
war with a culture ever increasingly steeped in the excesses of the mar-
ketplace. To what extent is it likely that the mission of education can
stand significantly free of the commercial entertainment culture? Even
Professors Nyberg and Rue, as they endorse this campaign, are sober
enough to admit that the odds of victory are slim. Nyberg concedes,
despite his aspirations, that we are starting from the point of "institu-
tional failure."'" And Rue's optimism is heavily qualified: "The whole
story is likely to be bleak enough, but it just might leave room for a
slightly happier ending.""5
Skepticism is amply warranted. If education is to combat rampant
commercialism and the like, educators must be mindful of how com-
mercialism pervades education on various fronts. On the operational
front, public elementary and secondary school districts are trading
more and more with marketers to overcome the constraints of tighten-
ing instructional budgets:
* More than eight million of our nation's students are tuned in daily to
Channel One-the station that pumps ads into classrooms-this de-
spite protests by the National Education Association and the National
PTA." Over 12,000 American high schools (accounting for forty per-
49. Nyberg, supra note 13, at 1217.
50. Id. at 1223.
51. Loyal Rue, After the Death of Discourse, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1277, 1289-90 (1996).
52. Nyberg, supra note 13, at 1217 (emphasis added).
53. Rue, supra note 51, at 1290 (emphases added).
54. MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, MARKETING MADNESS: A SUR-
VIVAL GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SOCIETY 29, 30 (1995).
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cent of high school students) are a captive audience for that channel."
A 1993 demographic study of Channel One schools revealed that
"schools with the greatest concentration of low-income students are
more than twice as likely as the schools with the wealthiest students to
have Channel One."56
e American corporations by the thousands supply curricular and extra-
curricular materials, from teacher's forestry guides prepared by Wey-
erhaeuser with self-serving "instructional" questions, to ad-laden book
covers, to corporate logos on athletic uniforms and in athletic
facilities. 7
* In response to its shrinking sources of funding, America's nonprofit
educational television, the Public Broadcasting Service, is quickly be-
coming a marketplace player-peddling its greatest hits through home-
shopping catalogues, joining arms with MCI Communications Corpo-
ration to hawk CD-ROMs and with the Turner Home Entertainment
division to market videotapes, and licensing the PBS logo to manufac-
turers of "educational" products. 8
e Anecdotal evidence tells the story even more strikingly. Palmer High
School in Colorado Springs, for example, supplements its revenue by
leasing school property to corporate advertisers. Hanging a six-foot-
long banner inside the school costs a marketer $700 per year; for
$2,500, corporate logos can be painted on the side of a yellow school
bus. With "plenty of blank wall space left to fill," Superintendent of
Schools Kenneth Burnley boasts that the district is "just scratching the
surface of potential revenue." 59 Banners and buses today, walls, lock-
ers, bulletin boards, desks, chalk boards, book pages, and computer
screens tomorrow.
Lest we be misunderstood, our larger point is that commerce's many
threads are interwoven more and more into the fabric of American
education. While our classrooms are not yet overtaken by commercial-
ism, there are discernible trends in that direction. Such trends are anti-
thetical to instilling the ethical values of republican simplicity, those of
Adams, Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, and the like. Hence, on the ide-
ological front, the commercialization of our schools is likely to redefine
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 30 (quoting UNPLUG, A National Youth Organization for Commercial-Free
Equitable Education, press release, Oct. 19, 1993) (emphasis deleted).
57. Id. at 31, 33, 34, 35.
58. Paul Farhi, Public TV's Private Ordeal: As Funding Growth Slows, PBS Casts Its
Eye on Commercial Ties, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at HI. For a more extensive account,
see generally WILLIAMS HOYNES, PUBLIC TELEVISION FOR SALE: MEDIA, THE MARKET, AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE (1994).
59. Where Madison Avenue Meets the Schoolhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at B8.
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the aspirational goals of the "good life." When students are educated
less about civics and more about commerce, less about self-restraint
and more about unbridled liberty, and less about public virtue and
more about private gain, the lessons of the marketplace become the
lessons of the schoolhouse. Whatever else, this is not education in
sophrosyni (sobriety, moderation).
If education is to rescue us, then to what end? Is it first and fore-
most paideia, the shaping of character to develop well-informed and
socially responsible citizens? Or is it rather job training in the service
of economic self-interest and pleasure? In this regard, psychology pro-
fessor Barry Schwartz reminds us that "the moral character of a cul-
ture is bound up with our judgment of the set of practices that the
culture encourages and supports."' 0 In a society that teaches its future
citizens to be entrepreneurs and consumers, "the good person becomes
the good pursuer of wealth." 1 It is nearly tautological: a culture that
highly values commerce will teach, above all, the values of commerce.
Even if our colleagues's campaign were to succeed and education
were to be essentially purged of all of commercialism's contaminations,
it is puzzling to imagine what that education would be like. To rein-
vigorate Madisonian values, would education return civic republican-
ism to the public mind? But then what? Would we defend the funda-
mental right of all to all forms of expression, and teach the need to
tolerate the base? Seemingly, this education would never move the
commercial entertainment culture beyond the point where it is now, or
ward off the Huxleyan dilemma"2 to which it is tending. Or would we
emphasize the need to combat the base, and thus withhold constitu-
tional protection from expression inimical to our high ideals?" Seem-
ingly, this education flirts with the censorship associated with Orwel-
lian regimes. In the end, have our colleagues not reintroduced in the
guise of educational reform their own version of what we labeled the
"Paratroopers' Paradox?"'
60. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE COSTS OF LIVING: How MARKET FREEDOM ERODES THE
BEST THINGS IN LIFE 184 (1994).
61. Id. at 185.
62. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 6-7.
63. This, at least, is what one great liberal educator, Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, urged.
For it was this president of Amherst College, later chairman of the Experimental College at
Wisconsin, who declared adamantly that the First Amendment ought not safeguard commercial
speech. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE xv-xvi, 86-88 (reprint, 1979).
64. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 4, 35-45, 134, 202.
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[Flearless thinking has fearless consequences ....
-Stanley Rosen"
We now leave the valleys of narrative truths, hypocrisy, and deliber-
ate lies, and take flight toward the heights where Professors Loyal Rue
and Richard Stivers would have us soar. For this mission no Piper
Cubs will do; bring out the F-14A Tomcats. We are, after all, entering
the realm of fearless thinking.
Professors Rue and Stivers maneuver around the topic of First
Amendment deliberate lies for two basic reasons. First, they believe
that Madisonian principles are virtually irrelevant in our highly tech-
nological and entertainment-driven society. Second, they understand
The Death of Discourse to be about more, far more, than America's
free speech system. Ultimately, they admonish us: we must never for-
get that it is a civilization we are examining.
"We have now reached the turning point," Professor Stivers as-
serts.6 "[Tihe probability of a return to Madisonian ideals is small
indeed and will take more than a shocking discourse, even if this is the
necessary first step."" In ways unimaginable to Madison's generation,
modern technology has seized an immense power over our laws, dis-
course, and culture. So great is that power that "[n]othing short of a
nonviolent cultural revolution, no matter how unlikely it may be, will
allow us to escape the modern tyranny of technology." ' Essentially,
Stivers's technological critique moves us from talk about First Amend-
ment reforms to talk about the transformation of America as a
civilization.
Similarly, Professor Rue calls on us to think beyond that "relatively
minor document" 9 known as the First Amendment so that "we are
brought to the heart of the matter: is it too late to save the American
experiment of self-governance? ' 70 For Rue, not only is the American
experiment not sacred, but ultimately, it is not worth saving. In a soci-
ety so ecologically imbalanced and so self-indulgent, even modest re-
forms are improbable, if only because they stand to be judged as tyran-
nical.71 Thus, Professor Rue bids " 'good-riddance' to the American
65. RosEN, supra note 8, at 138. Professor Rosen concludes the observation quoted in the
text with the following: "and never more so than in times of extreme decadence." Id.
66. Richard Stivers, Technology, Discourse, and Truth, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1259, 1267
(1996).
67. Id. at 1275.
68. Id. at 1276.
69. Rue, supra note 51, at 1280.
70. Id. at 1289.
71. Professor Rue does offer a modest variation of his bio-cultural approach, one calling
for local regulation of pornography and federal luxury taxes. Id. at 1280-88. But ultimately, he
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Dream," a social experiment that has "miserably failed."'7 2 With delib-
erative irreverence, he quips: "The patch of land between Mexico and
Canada might become the former United States of America. Okay, so
what's all the fuss about? It's bound to happen sooner or later, so why
not sooner ?"
'78
Consider this: "[D]isdain of that which belongs to the present moment
is an integral part of philosophical contemplation.
'7 4
Bold statements, gentlemen. "Hyperbolic" or not, such reflections
engage The Death of Discourse in two important dialogic ways. First,
they begin (explicitly or otherwise) to play out the consequences of our
"cultural approach" to the First Amendment .7 The cultural approach,
as we sketch it, may extend to Stivers's sociological claims about tech-
nology and to Rue's ecological claims about civilization. Our approach
need not validate these claims in order to recognize the value in seri-
ously considering them. Such thinking is made possible, of course, pre-
cisely because our colleagues' discourse about the First Amendment
covers the terrain from Orwellian tyranny to Huxleyan tyranny, and
beyond-a journey never ventured by "dunderheads." '7 6
Second, both Professors Rue and Stivers escape the paradox of the
traditional First Amendment as formulated in The Death of Dis-
course. They do so, however, by denying the relevancy of Madisonian
ideals and challenging the viability of Madisonian government. Funda-
mentally, our colleagues appreciate our hypothesis that the traditional
First Amendment cannot save itself without destroying itself. In the
spirit of Albert Camus, they engage us in a "discourse of death."77
We leave it to you, the readers of this Symposium, to decide whether
our colleagues have brought their terrifying Tomcats in for a safe
landing, or whether they have parachuted. You be the judge.
concedes that such an approach may be "well beyond the realm of possibility, for how could
such proposals gather support in a culture where the target of legislation gets to ration the
bullets and determine who shoots?" Id. at 1288-89.
72. Id. at 1291.
73. Id. at 1290.
74. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Pathos of Truth (1872), in PHILOSOPHICAL WRIT-
INGS 85 (Reinhold Grimm and Caroline Molina y Vedia eds. & Bruce Armstrong trans., 1995).
Of course, we are not accusing our colleagues of being "Nietzschean," whatever that may mean.
75. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at xxi-xxv, 199-202, 211-15.
76. Rue, supra note 51, at 1279.
77. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 4, at 211-16.
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Pointless stories are met with the withering
rejoinder, "So what?" Every good narrator
is continually warding off this question; when
his narrative is over it should be unthinkable
for a by-stander to say, "So what?"
-William Labov
7a
Over three decades ago, Justice William Brennan proclaimed the
"4central meaning of the First Amendment."79 It was an affirmation of
Madisonian principles.8 0 However glorious, that moment was short-
lived; for never once has the Court again invoked Brennan's famous
declaration. Nor has the Court since paid much but idle lip-service to
traditional Madisonian ideals. Apparently, the Court has no coherent
theory, only case-by-case "balancing" and ever-changing legal doc-
trines. This is predictable. The postmodern First Amendment has no
central meaning. It defies meaning to the point that it means nearly all
things to all people. Broadly understood, expression is heralded as an
end in itself. Free speech values, like a faith in reason, have become
pass6.
This is the regime of First Amendment myths and narrative truths.
In this realm, there are no Madisonian truths, no Enlightenment reali-
ties, and no noble lies. There are mainly stories about contingent
truths, virtual realities, and aesthetic tastes. Thus, Alexander Bickel's
protest that "total relativism ... cannot be the theory of our Constitu-
tion"81 is likely to be met with the rejoinder, "So what?"
By contrast, when the narrators of liberal democracy paint a patina
of respectability on the excesses of an unrespectable state, they cannot
reasonably hope to redirect our commercial entertainment culture. The
divide between ennobling First Amendment narratives and ignoble free
speech practices may already be too wide to cross. Thus, the pragmati-
cally-minded Bickel would likely counter such romantic stories with
the rejoinder, "So what?"
78. William Labov, Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience, in AMERI-
CAN ETHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, ESSAYS ON THE VERBAL AND VISUAL ARTS: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 37-38 (June Helm ed., 1967).
79. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
80. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 140-52 (Random House, Inc. 1991); id. at 153 (noting that New York Times v.
Sullivan was the "first full statement by the Supreme Court as a whole of an American theory
of free speech: the Madisonian theory").
81. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 77.
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We now take leave, very grateful to our colleagues in this Sympo-
sium for engaging us after The Death of Discourse. If we meet again,
may our discourse be as lively.82
82. As to where we may meet next, see (if you will) the website for The Death of Dis-
course at http://www.researchpro.com.
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